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In an attempt to decentre the debate of democracy promotion in the
Mediterranean, this article applies social constructivism to an analysis of the work
undertaken by two International Parliamentary Bodies in the Mediterranean.
With a focus on the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
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move on to discuss whether newly formed democratic parliaments, as in Tunisia,
may represent a more legitimate and viable source of parliamentary-driven de-
mocracy promotion.
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1. Introduction
As democratisation efforts increased after the beginning of the Arab Spring in
2011, the work of the international community to influence change in the region
became a major topic of academic debate. Part of that interest has focused on the
role of parliamentary bodies, both domestic and international. However, the pro-
liferation of International Parliamentary Institutions (IPIs) in the region raises
the question as to whether they have had any actual impact. By focusing on the
activities of the European Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Mediterranean, this article will analyse the contribution of IPIs to democracy
promotion in the region and discuss the potential of national parliaments to rep-
resent more legitimate sources for change in North Africa by analysing the
Tunisian parliament’s role in the country’s democratic transition.
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2. The Arab Spring and Europe’s response
The Arab Spring or Awakening began in Tunisia in December 2010 and quickly
spread across North Africa and the Middle East. Within months, established rul-
ers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen had been forced from power while
Bahrain and Syria faced serious civil unrest. Of these countries, Tunisia is be-
lieved to have fared best, having transitioned into a semi-presidential, if not
flawed, representative democracy. The other states fared less well and either
descended into civil war (Libya and Syria), saw the entrenchment of old regimes
through partial constitutional reforms (Morocco) or saw the reinstatement of old
patterns of authoritarian control (Egypt) though political unrest in Sudan from
December 2018 and in Algeria from February 2019 have led some to question
whether we are seeing a new Arab Spring (Alterman, 2019).
The European Union has a long history of cooperation with the
Mediterranean, in particular with the Maghreb countries. From 1972, the
European community tried to establish a coherent approach to the region with
the launch of the Global Mediterranean Policy and France, Spain and (to a lesser
degree) Italy have consistently pushed for European Community/Union policies
for the Mediterranean over the years. That push culminated in the 1995 Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the 2003 European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)
and the 2008 Union for the Mediterranean though none of these initiatives met
the expectations with which they were originally launched. The European Union
is often hampered in the region by the fact that its competences are limited out-
side the area of trade while its foreign and security policy necessitates unanimity;
the need for compromise between its Member States has often meant that con-
cerns regarding migration, terrorism or energy supplies led the Union to favour
stable regimes in the Mediterranean over accountable ones.
The European Union’s initial response to the Arab Spring focused primarily
on its diplomatic and trade efforts with no military involvement other than on a
unilateral basis or under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation with 10 EU
countries eventually participating in ‘Unified Protector’, led by France and the
UK. In the area of trade and diplomacy, the EU’s potential was more pronounced
and after the ousting of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, the EU, through the
High Representative, promised enhanced economic support in return for consti-
tutional reforms and free elections. Soon after the EU issued a revamped
Neighbourhood Policy for the region promising the 3Ms, namely ‘money, mobil-
ity and markets’ on condition that partner countries would deliver on building
and consolidating democratic political systems.
It is debatable as to what degree the EU’s policy in the region has contributed
to political transformation, especially as the political outcomes of the Arab
Spring have varied so widely while being underscored by the same EU approach.
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Some argue that the EU’s policy in the region has been dominated by two simul-
taneously present discourses, namely the cooperative security discourse, with an
emphasis on common security challenges, and the liberal reform discourse with
the focus on democratisation and liberalisation as a way of solving regional
problems and enhancing EU security (Malmvig, 2004). In addition to this
consideration, ‘another common criticism is the narrow conception of democ-
racy, defined as “fuzzy liberalism” used by EU actors’ (Gomez Isa and Munoz
Nogal, 2016, p. 16) with Jonasson (2013) arguing that this reveals a liberal bias
orientated towards market economics, individual rights and prioritising funds to
support civil society.
The aim of this article is to analyse the role played by parliaments in the demo-
cratisation process in the region. We begin by discussing democracy promotion
and the potential for parliaments to play a role before analysing the various par-
liamentary bodies active in the region. We then move on to analyse the actual
work of two parliamentary bodies in more detail, namely the European
Parliament and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean. The latter rep-
resents one of the two intra-regional parliamentary bodies in the Mediterranean
while the former, the European Parliament, has been the most conspicuous and
consistent IPI actor in terms of democratic promotion in the Mediterranean both
before and after the 2011 Arab Spring. From here, we then analyse the potential
represented by the emerging democratic parliaments in the region, with a special
focus on Tunisia, to represent agents of democratisation with greater regional
legitimacy.
3. Parliaments and democratisation
Grugel (2007) talks about democratisation as sitting at the intersection of do-
mestic and global and involves two stages, transition and consolidation.
‘Democratisation is a process of identity transformation during which the
norms of “popular control and equality” gradually become embedded in
states and societies’ (Grugel, 2007, p. 172). At its core, it requires a shift in
the identity of elites as they accept a relative loss of social and political au-
thority. For Flockhart, the ‘focus is on the external influences on democrat-
isation through the promotion/socialisation of a specific set espousing a
commitment to a “Western” conception of liberal democracy, human rights,
the rule of law and a market economy, and how the results of the processes
of change at the domestic level “loop back” to the external level with struc-
tural change’ (Flockhart, 2005, p. 6). In this way, much of the debate on
democratisation is now firmly embedded in social constructivism.
Social constructivists concur that socialisation takes place best after a critical
juncture or a destabilizing ideational shock which undermines established
Democratisation without Coercion 3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pa/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pa/gsz020/5528518 by U
niversity of M
alta user on 28 July 2020
norms, leaving the agents in a state of ‘normlessness’ but that new norms
cannot be expected to land freely and should be promoted by someone
(Checkel, 1999; Marcussen, 2000). In social constructivism, norms and social-
isation play an important role in identity construction. To encourage social-
isation, two different strategies are highlighted in the literature, namely social
influence and persuasion. In terms of influence, the emphasis is upon the
distribution of social rewards and punishments as a means of influencing pro-
norm behaviour. In terms of persuasion, the emphasis here is upon the use of
material or mental coercion to bring about change. However, the above depends
on the actor being socialised as identifying with the higher group, which might
not be the case with the Mediterranean states (Flockhart, 2005, p. 49). Further
to this, the idea is also that the norm should land deeply, hence the importance
of the receiving group and their link with the wider population in the receiving
state, so as to ensure that norm transfer does not remain an elite exercise.
Ultimately, Flockhart develops a model which hinges on whether the receiving
state aspires to western ideals and what form of institutions it has, namely
liberal democratic government. If there are limited opportunities to socialise,
then norm transfer cannot land (Flockhart, 2005, p. 58). With the emphasis in
this article on the role of external actors in the region, the ‘outside’ dimension is
key for understanding the role of IPIs in the region. Ultimately, ‘external norms
stand more chance of taking root when they converge with already-established
cultural practices’ (Acharya, 2004 as quoted in Grugel, 2007, p. 174). This senti-
ment echoes the opinion of Jonasson (2013) who argues that there must be
three vital elements for democracy promotion, namely orientation towards the
project of democracy promotion on the part of the target country, local owner-
ship of the project and dialogue between the democracy promotor and different
segments of the target state.
In terms of the latter, a key variable is how the external norms land in the
agent country, including access to the country and establishment of winning coa-
litions. In particular, Flockhart talks about the standing of social groups and how
our aspiration to join them may determine our openness to the norms they are
representing. As will be discussed, this has been a challenge for external actors
like the EU with Ross Smith measuring the effectiveness of the Union in influenc-
ing democratisation by focusing on its efforts in terms of legitimacy (does the EU
prioritise normative goals over economic ones), identification (does the target
group identify with EU ideals) and resonance (were the two sides on the same
page normatively) (Ross Smith, 2011, p. 398). Ultimately, this reflects the reality
that the EU itself recognises, namely that the third country must want democracy:
‘The last ENP review admitted . . . that the effectiveness of this approach
depended on the readiness of third country governments to cooperate’ (Zamfir
et al., 2016).
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Beyond the EU, with the growing interest in non-traditional inter-state diplo-
macy, the academic literature has also seen an increase in interest regarding the
work of parliaments and parliamentary bodies in diplomacy. This reflects the fact
that these bodies have engaged in a wide range of international activities includ-
ing communication, reporting, policy analysis and some forms of representation
(Cofelice and Stavridis, 2017, p. 4). Parliamentary diplomacy means ‘the activities
of parliamentarians that are aimed at increasing “mutual understanding between
countries, to assist each other in improving the control of governments and the
representation of a people”’, (Weisglas and de Boer, 2007, p. 94; Fiott, 2015, p.
2). In defining parliamentary diplomacy, it is more than just parliamentary coop-
eration with the literature referring to the fact that parliamentarians do not al-
ways concur with their government’s stated position, giving them ‘a margin of
flexibility that is denied to diplomats’ (Beetham, 2006, p. 6); Reinprecht and
Levin define this as parliamentarians being able to speak more plainly because
they wield less power than governments, which also makes them more flexible
and less likely to harm inter-state relations (Reinprecht and Levin, 2015, p. 9).
That said, others argue that it can result in parliamentary tourism with a lack of
continuity due to the brevity in political career of some parliamentarians.
In analysing the work of parliaments, the literature makes reference to the
functions associated with parliaments as including parliamentary legislation, lis-
tening, international exchange and training, field missions in crisis areas as well
as acting as a moral tribune (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 102). However, as the discussion
on social constructivism shows, it is not enough to simply initiate parliamentary
diplomacy; in addition to assessing how IPIs actively engage with the region, it is
central to also assess how that involvement is received and followed through into
domestic consolidation of democratic principles in the receiving states.
Therefore, in an attempt to decentre the debate and add to the literature, we will
apply social constructivism, a principle context for understanding democracy
and democratisation, as well as an increasingly popular framework for under-
standing the EU (Jupille et al., 2003; Risse, 2005), to the efforts of parliaments in
promoting political change in North Africa since the Arab Spring.
4. Parliamentary bodies in the Mediterranean
Parliamentary bodies in the Mediterranean have increased significantly in the last
two decades. Cofelice and Stavridis distinguish them in terms of the level of gov-
ernance, from the most local to the more global (Cofelice and Stavridis, 2017,
p. 8). Taking the number of chambers in the EU and Mediterranean riparian
states, they calculate there are 66 parliamentary chambers in the region, not in-
cluding sub-state parliaments as in Spain. Beyond the national parliaments they
then list IPIs which they subdivide into five groups:
Democratisation without Coercion 5
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pa/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pa/gsz020/5528518 by U
niversity of M
alta user on 28 July 2020
(1) parliamentary entities with a universal or non-geographical membership as
with the Inter-Parliamentary Union;
(2) parliamentary entities with membership comprising countries from the
northern shore of the Mediterranean such as the European Parliament;
(3) parliamentary entities with membership comprising countries from the
southern shore, such as the Pan-African Parliament;
(4) North-South Mediterranean parliamentary bodies, namely the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM) and
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM); and
(5) IPIs which are not specifically Mediterranean centric, but have a strong
Mediterranean dimension such as the World Hellenic Inter-Parliamentary
Association.
As they note, only the fourth group truly represents an intra-regional IPI,
where parliamentarians from both shores meet exclusively, a key distinction for
our topic. Cofelice and Stavridis see this proliferation of parliamentary bodies in
the region as reflecting the push by international organisations to expand into the
region as well as an attempt for countries to ‘forum shop’ (Cofelice and Stavridis,
2017, p. 21). However, this proliferation of IPIs has two features that can question
their utility, namely their structure and functions. In particular, they note that
most of these institutions involve a plenary, a bureau and standing committees
but little else while most IPIs are restricted to issuing non-binding statements
with limited impact outside of the IPIs.
With our emphasis upon the role of parliamentary bodies as democratising
agents in the region, we will focus on the work of IPIs from the second and
fourth group as these have an exclusive or specialised regional focus, a wholly
or significant membership of European delegates from democratic states as
well as having, as part of their mandates, democracy promotion. To this end,
we focus upon the work of the EP and PAM, both conspicuous parliamentary
actors in the region.
4.1 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean was established through the
institutionalisation process of the Inter-parliamentary Conference on Security
and Cooperation in the Mediterranean which was itself established by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union in 1992. With 27 fulltime members, it is the only
Mediterranean institution with exclusive membership from the littoral countries
of the Mediterranean and held its first plenary in September 2006 (Cofelice,
2016a, p. 295).
6 Parliamentary Affairs
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/pa/article-abstract/doi/10.1093/pa/gsz020/5528518 by U
niversity of M
alta user on 28 July 2020
PAM’s mandate is two-fold, the first being conflict prevention, resolution and
crisis management through parliamentary diplomacy. Its second is the promo-
tion of human rights and democracy, as reaffirmed in PAM’s political manifesto,
The Charter of the Mediterranean, adopted in 2008, where democracy and human
rights are the ‘foundation stones for the actions of PAM’ (Cofelice, 2016a,
p. 297). The 27 national delegations are composed of a maximum of 5 members,
elected or appointed by national parliaments, with each national delegation hav-
ing equal voting rights. The Assembly’s plenary meets once a year, but the major-
ity of its work is undertaken by three committees dealing with: political and
security-related cooperation; economic, social and environmental cooperation;
and dialogue among civilisations and human rights. The Bureau ensures continu-
ity and is based in Malta. Unlike other bodies such as the UfM-PA, PAM does
not tackle issues of input legitimacy, allowing the participating states to nominate
their delegates (Cofelice, 2016a, p. 298). In this way, while the UfM-PA sus-
pended Syria after the upheavals in that country, PAM has never taken steps to
suspend a member. This can bring into question PAM’s stated aim of contribut-
ing to democracy but also facilitates its role of creating dialogue and respect for
difference of opinion.
PAM’s tools primarily centre on soft diplomacy, comprising non-binding
reports, opinions, resolutions and declarations as PAM lacks an intergovernmen-
tal counterpart and therefore cannot exercise core parliamentary functions like
policy making and oversight of the executive (Cofelice, 2016a, p. 299). But,
through its role as ‘norm entrepreneur’ and with technical assistance, it is able to
promote democracy while its role as moral tribune and its parliamentary diplo-
macy allow it to address conflict resolution and crisis management (Cofelice,
2016a, p. 299).
4.2 The European Parliament
The European Parliament, originally established in 1952 as the European Coal
and Steel Community’s Assembly, is a directly elected parliament comprising 751
members from the 28 EU Member States, seats being allocated in proportion to
each country’s population size and with members sitting in 8 party groups, pri-
marily constituted on the left/right political spectrum. With oversight of the EU’s
budget, legislative powers shared with the Member States (sitting in the Council
of the EU) and oversight of the Commission, the EP is considered one of the
most powerful parliaments in the world.
The European Parliament’s role in democracy promotion takes place within
the parameters of the Union’s competence in this area as provided under the trea-
ties. Since 2009, the EU has undertaken democracy promotion through a
country-specific approach, stakeholder involvement and greater coherency with
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democracy and human rights being mainstreamed across all policy areas. These
policies have been supported by the European Instrument for Democracy and
Human Rights, as well as more specific funds for the EU’s neighbours, namely
the European Neighbourhood Instrument and the Neighbourhood Civil Society
Facility. In addition to these funds, there are also additional funds related to de-
velopment policy, the European Endowment for Democracy and the EU’s
Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.
Parliament contributes to democratisation through various activities, espe-
cially as EU co-legislature in areas such as trade agreements and development pol-
icy. More specifically, it also promotes these ideals through participation in the
EU’s election observation missions. Complimentary to this, the EP also involves
itself in election follow-up, human rights and support for parliamentary work. In
terms of the latter, the EP helps parliaments outside the EU in strengthening in-
stitutional capacity (with conferences and seminars, joint training programmes
and study visits). The EP also gives support in the area of mediation and dialogue.
Parliament’s work in this area is channelled through two principal committees,
that on Foreign Affairs and the other on Development, while the Parliament’s
Democracy Support and Election Coordination Group provides political guid-
ance overall.
5. Analysis of the impact of IPIs in the region
As outlined above, parliamentary diplomacy is normally differentiated in terms
of acting as a moral tribune, parliamentary legislation, listening, international
exchanges and training as well as field missions in crisis areas (Cofelice, 2016b).
Through these activities, parliaments can contribute to democracy promotion
and crisis management, as was the case in the Mediterranean with the EP and the
PAM.
In terms of acting as a moral tribune, the EP took a coherent and active role as
a moral tribune in the region, being forceful in recognising the Arab Spring as le-
gitimate representation of the wishes of Arab societies and condemning the use of
force against protestors (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 103). Also, the EP was of note in pro-
moting the responsibility-to-protect (R2P) concept (Stavridis and Ferna´ndez
Molina, 2013).1 This way, the EP is believed to have taken a clear lead, immedi-
ately expressing solidarity with the protestors, identifying with them and provid-
ing support at a time when other actors, such as the High Representative, were
more cautious and advocated for stability (Reinprecht and Levin, 2015).
1The Responsibility to Protect (R2P or RtoP) is a commitment endorsed by the United Nations at the
2005 World Summit with the aim to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity.
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Subsequently, the EP maintained its support for transition, seeing the protests as
a wish for popular democratisation and through the Committee on Foreign
Affairs (AFET) and the Subcommittee on Human Rights (DROI), the EP issued
repeated statements declaring that the demonstrations were legitimate represen-
tations of the desires of Arab societies.
In this area, PAM was less categorical as an actor, calling for the need to over-
come current challenges in the region but not taking sides. This difference reflects
the fact that PAM only meets once a year, meaning that it is slower to react to
developments. Also, because positions need unanimity or 4/5 support, its conclu-
sions always involve broad compromise (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 106). In terms of
R2P, it took PAM until 2015 for it to include R2P in its plenary discussions and
then by placing emphasis on the first pillar which focuses on governments and
the need to protect their civilians. Ultimately, PAM’s policy of not interfering in
the composition of national delegations means that PAM does not actively act as
a moral tribune.
In the area of parliamentary legislation and oversight, the EP has extensive leg-
islative powers within the EU framework and used these in terms of the Arab
Spring, drafting their own recommendations for the revamped Neighbourhood
Policy and pushing for the ‘more for more’ principle; for the EP, the parliament
was determined to reverse the ENP approach where ‘securitised relationships
marginalised “[European] normative principles and aspirations for Arab reform”’
(Hollis, 2012, p. 94). To consolidate its monitoring function, the EP also estab-
lished the Monitoring Group on the Situation in the Southern Mediterranean un-
der the AFET with special focus on oversight of the EU’s financial assistance to
the region (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 108). On the other side, PAM could not undertake
these functions directly other than in recommending standards as a norm entre-
preneur; in some of these cases, the PAM tried to reinterpret certain rights, as it
did notably with the definition of terrorism, adopted in 2009. While some coun-
tries did not participate in voting, PAM persevered and has tried in other areas to
replicate this, as with forced migration and organised waste trafficking (Cofelice,
2016a, p. 231). In the same way, PAM has also tried to harmonise the legislation
of Member States in the area of family law, domestic violence and strategies to
combat public sector corruption, but PAM has no follow-up mechanism and this
creates an institutional deficit; without follow-up mechanisms and with highly
generalised reports which shy away from naming and shaming member countries,
its role as a norm entrepreneur is severely hampered (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 110).
In terms of listening, where listening is defined as ‘the collection and analysis
of data or information or opinion from the target foreign public by an interna-
tional actor’, the EP was considered to have a natural strength in this area,
through inter-parliamentary delegations with Middle East and North African
(MENA) parliaments, joint parliamentary committees and the PA-UfM assembly
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(Cull quoted in Reinprecht and Levin, 2015, p. 11). This role of listening was
complemented by ad hoc and standing committees as well as the President of the
EP, political groups and individual MEPs visiting the region. Because of its re-
gional delegations, the EP is unique in having a track record of full-time politi-
cians focused on and travelling to the region. In addition to the individual visits,
the Monitoring Group on the Situation in the Southern Mediterranean facilitated
the diffusion of information among various stakeholders including the European
External Action Service and the Commission. PAM also functions in this capac-
ity; in particular, PAM’s cross-regional membership facilitates listening while its
missions to various countries in the region have shown a willingness to engage in
listening, though Cofelice concedes that PAM has been less successful in terms of
civil society preferring to interact with national and regional representatives
(Cofelice, 2016b).
In the area of international exchanges and training, both IPIs have been active.
In terms of international exchanges, the EP managed these through the Office for
the Promotion of Parliamentary Democracy (OPPD), which was created in 2008.
Centred on the assumption that the EP was a model, the OPPD offered capacity
building services, reform guidance, election monitoring follow-up, exchange of
best practice, civic cultivation of online public spaces and peer-to-peer mentor-
ing. While not restricted to the ENP countries, the programmes were rebalanced
towards the MENA countries in 2011 after the Arab Spring with many of the
OPPD’s documents being translated into Arabic. The OPPD organised training
seminars for staff, members and candidates of Southern Mediterranean parlia-
ments with particular emphasis on female and minority representation. When
the EU-Arab summit issued the Cairo Declaration in 2012, a key commitment
was for the ‘European Parliament and the Arab Parliament to strengthen com-
munication’ (Reinprecht and Levin, 2015, p. 22). In terms of professional
exchanges, these were managed through the Young Political Leaders programme
with the first Young Leaders Middle East forum being held in 2012. In terms of
PAM, while it has always used training as a tool, since the Arab Spring the focus
has been upon human rights and terrorism. To maximise its capacity for dia-
logue, PAM has also been given observatory status to other regional IPIs, such as
the Maghreb Consultative Council (Cofelice, 2016b, p. 113).
In terms of field missions to crisis areas, the EP focuses primarily on election
monitoring and established a small mediation unit within its Secretariat, as dis-
cussed previously. For PAM, this is a major focus. In terms of crisis management,
PAM originally focused on the Middle East but turned towards North Africa with
the Arab Spring. In particular, it has always supported the UN and other players
in trying to resolve conflict in the region and has made three important contribu-
tions; first, financial support, to fund pilot projects in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco
and Tunisia. This has been undertaken through the European Bank for
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Reconstruction and Development. Secondly, it helped with constitutional reform
in Tunisia and Libya, with PAM being one of the first parliamentary delegations
to visit Tunisia and to assist with the constitutional reform process. It also estab-
lished a joint mission to Libya to help the country reform and established parlia-
mentary training sessions for Libyan MPs (Cofelice, 2016a, p. 306). Thirdly, PAM
has been active in Libya and Syria on humanitarian missions. Finally, PAM has
also established an MP pool to help with crisis management in conflict areas and
to help facilitate negotiations.
From the discussion, it can be seen that IPIs have played a significant role in
the region but that more has been done in terms of crisis management than de-
mocracy promotion. Ultimately, the ability of IPIs to be effective democracy pro-
motors is limited because they often do not have the ability to speak with
legitimacy because the values being recommended are external (EP) or circum-
scribed because of the need for intra-regional consensus (PAM). Further to this,
the ability to effect change through social influence or persuasion is limited. In
terms of the EP, it has the ability to persuade through its capacity to influence EU
policies in the region but heavy handed influence does not always land well; the
use of social rewards or shaming is limited when the actor is external and the IPI
is promoting ideals which do not resonate in the region, especially liberal values
including minority rights. The PAM is also limited in this respect due to the fact
that its declarations are consensus based, and it has no follow-up capacity mean-
ing that there is no attempt to monitor the degree to which its message lands in
the region. Further to this, it is important that the actor through which the nor-
mative transfer is happening, national parliamentarians in our case, are deeply
embedded in the domestic political system with links to the people which then
reinforces democratisation. Regretfully, national parliaments (and foreign actors
like the EU) do not always enjoy popular legitimacy in the Arab states that such a
relationship would necessitate. Ultimately, the IPIs are better suited for providing
crisis management roles than effective democracy promotors in the region. With
this assessment, the capacity for international parliamentary bodies to act as
agents of change may appear limited. That said the establishment of national,
democratic parliaments in the region and their role as exporters of a more ethno-
centrically acceptable form of democracy may represent a more viable potential
for parliaments to play a role in the region as well as representing a more promis-
ing and legitimate partner for IPIs in ensuring that any normative transfer would
land in the target country with greater legitimacy.
6. The Tunisian Parliament
Before 2011, parliaments had little influence in Arab politics, ‘Arab parliaments
saw themselves as a part of their governing regimes, rather than as critical
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counterweights’ (Volkel, 2017, p. 596). In the same vein, ‘literature on regional
parliaments in Africa is inchoate, embryonic, scarce and dispersed. This may be
attributed to the little appetite that researchers may have for such regional parlia-
mentary outfits regarded as weak and ineffective’ (Stavridis and Irrera, 2015,
p. 157).
There are only two parliaments in the region which can be considered within a
democratic framework, namely Turkey and Tunisia, though both states are classi-
fied as only partially free and democratic. While Turkey has a longer democratic
tradition, the swing towards a more presidential form of government under
Erdogan as well as Tunisia’s significance for the Arab Spring movement, would
indicate a greater potential for parliamentary diplomacy to be played by the
Tunisian parliament; ‘One of the things Tunisians got right (after the revolution)
was the rejection of presidentialism in favour of parliamentary democracy.
Tunisians recognised the dangers of presidentialism in a country with a weak
democratic tradition and historic lack of checks and balances’ (Sezgin, 2015,
p. 36). In fact, ‘if there is any model of Muslim democracy post-Arab Spring, it is
Tunisia, not Turkey’ (Sezgin, 2015, p. 36).
The Tunisian constitution was adopted in 2014 after 2 years of consultation
and drafting. While not always smooth, the national dialogue and the work of the
National Constituent Assembly managed to broker a compromise among the var-
ious factions, in particular secularist, led by the Nidaa Tounes party, and
Islamists, primarily represented by the mainstream Ennahda party. Tunisia is
now classified as a unitary, semi-presidential representative democracy with the
president sharing executive power with the government and having competence
over defence, foreign policy and national security, power of key appointments,
including that of the Grand Mufti and the head of the central bank, as well as
enjoying legal immunity while in power. Beji Caid Essebsi, founder of Nidaa
Tounes, was elected President in 2014 and remains in office, presidential elections
due next in November 2019. The Assembly of Representatives of the People
(ARP) is a unicameral parliament with 217 members, over 30% of whom are fe-
male. Bills can be proposed by the President or by the Head of Government as
well as by (at least) 10 members of the house. Bills and amendments are struck
down if they damage the Finance Acts’ budgetary balance and ordinary laws can
be passed with a simple majority (as long as this represents a minimum third of
the ARP members). In the 2014 parliamentary elections, Nidaa Tounes won 85
seats and Ennahda won 69 with 13 other parties also being elected to the house.
The current Prime Minister, Youssef Chahad (Nidaa Tounes), was appointed in
2016 with parliamentary elections due in October 2019. It has been noted that
the ‘Tunisian constitution is the first in the Arab world written outside the influ-
ence of a dictator or foreign power’ (Pickard, 2014, p. 4) and that the political
system created in 2014 ‘departs from the tradition of constitutional
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authoritarianism and, at least in its written form, could serve as a genuine guar-
antor of democracy’ (Pickard, 2014, p. 137). In this way, the Tunisian political
system is an important phenomena in the region, a transitioning political system
underscored by broad human rights that might not fully mirror European values
but which are ground-breaking for the region and primarily self-referencing, giv-
ing a greater potential for deep democratisation in a social constructivist sense
because the values are formed in a North African framework. Ultimately,
‘Tunisia’s constitution . . . is rightly regarded as a milestone in North Africa’s po-
litical history, and the region’s most progressive and democratic constitution’
(Gallien and Werenfels, 2019, p. 2), effectively limiting the role of the military,
guaranteeing equality between the sexes, ensuring judicial independence as well
as the separation of religion and politics.
However, while Tunisia has fared better than other countries in the region af-
ter the Arab Spring, it has not been without its problems. Terrorist attacks in
2015 brought about the effective collapse of the tourism industry with public
debt increasing to 70% of gross domestic product and foreign currency reserves
becoming so low that the IMF was forced to issue a financing facility in 2016 and
inflation still continues to be a problem. From January 2018, in reaction to new
financing laws which increased taxes, demonstrations increasingly turned violent
and reflected a growing tide of unhappiness at the country’s economic and politi-
cal situation; in particular, that attempts at reforms seemed hampered by
entrenched interests (primarily the unions, corrupt elites and leaders of the infor-
mal economy that dominates remote regions) (Smith, 2018, p. 11). Parliament’s
passing of the Reconciliation Law in September 2017, which grants impunity to
public servants accused of corruption prior to 2011, was especially noteworthy
for undermining the country’s attempts to combat corruption as was the
Parliament’s decision to end the Truth and Dignity Commission in 2018. Added
to the fact that the Constitutional Court, stipulated in the constitution, still
remains to be appointed as well as recent amendments to the Law of Association
(which now obligates non-governmental organisations to register with a national
registry of institutions, a procedure adopted without civil society consultation)
all mean that Tunisian politics is not without its problems, leading some to claim
that the country is at a cross roads (Grewal, 2019) or even in a situation of ‘demo-
cratic backsliding’ (Fassihian, 2018). Youssef Chahad is now Tunisia’s seventh
Prime Minister since the revolution and has faced repeated calls to stand down,
embroiled in an increasingly bitter battle with the new leader of Nidaa, Hafedh
Essebi, the son of the President. Some now claim that Tunisia ‘is in danger of de-
veloping into a hybrid system: part democratic, part authoritarian’ (Gallien and
Werenfels, 2019, p. 1).
While recent events paint an increasingly pessimistic view of Tunisian politics,
there is still reason to be optimistic about Tunisia’s future, not least the fact that
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Tunisian democracy has survived despite regional instability and serious security
threats with municipal elections being held in 2018; Tunisia still has the potential,
through parliamentary diplomacy, to play a unique role in IPIs as leading the way
in terms of a socially acceptable brand of North African democracy which could
be borrowed by other countries in the region. However, this potential is tempered
by several realities.
While democracy appeared to be consolidated after 2014, recent surveys have
indicated waning enthusiasm for democracy as a system. In Afrobarometer’s sur-
vey of 2018, 79% of respondents felt that the country was going in the wrong di-
rection (up from 61% in 2015) with those expressing a preference for democracy
dropping from 71% in 2015 to 46% in 2018 (Afrobarometer, 2019). Support for
elections also declined, from 94% in 2013 to 90% in 2015 and then further down
to 64% in 2018. The declining support for the political system seemed exempli-
fied in Spring 2018 when only 33.7% of voters turned out for Tunisia’s first mu-
nicipal elections with the majority of those elected being independents
(Fassihian, 2018).
The general unhappiness with politics and politicians seems clear. When asked
in 2018, 96% of respondents had never contacted an MP, while 95% had never
contacted a political party. To that effect, 81% indicated that they did not feel
close to a party, whereas 55% felt that political parties created division and confu-
sion in the country (Afrobarometer, 2019). When asked about the role of parlia-
ment, 36% felt that the President ignored Parliament and did what he wanted
and that most people felt MPs were involved in corruption with 34% saying
some of them, 12% saying most of them and 17% indicating all MPs were cor-
rupt (Afrobarometer, 2019). When asked whether they approved how MPs had
done their job in the previous 12 months, 22% strongly disapproved, 20% disap-
proved, while only 22% approved. Ultimately, the parties were seen as leading the
country into stagnation, often quarrelling and satisfying no one. With a budget
less than one-fourth of that given to the President’s office, ‘members of parlia-
ment consequently lack staff and office space. They rarely travel outside Tunis to
meet constituents or influence the bills that their party leaders tell them to vote
on. These and other weaknesses prevent the parliament from operating as an in-
dependent centre of power’ (Fassihian, 2018, p. 3). In this way, political parties
and MPs are often seen as part and parcel of the country’s problems, not the cen-
tre of power for resolving them. Therefore, while popular support for democracy
remains, the legitimacy of parliament is compromised and therefore its ability to
imbue the population with democratic fervour. If anything, the turmoil sur-
rounding the Reconciliation Law would suggest that the people are the driving
force behind the normative transfer of democratic values as they were the actors
who took to the streets to protest against policies which undermined the coun-
try’s democratic credentials.
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Problematic is also the feeling that the Tunisian model could not be replicated
in other countries. ‘I believe that the success of national dialogue in Tunisia is
rooted in forces that were deeply embedded in the soil of one country, particu-
larly the absence of a politicised military and the presence of a massive domestic
force, the General Union of Tunisian Workers . . .. This has no parallel in the
Middle East. While Tunisia and its National Dialogue offer an inspiring example
for the region, given such unique circumstances, it is unlikely to become a model
that can be easily emulated elsewhere’ (Brumberg, 2015, p. 56). Robbin’s argues
that Egyptians hate the players, Tunisians hate the game and this could indicate
that even Tunisia’s ability to export its democratic model is fragile and therefore
so is the ability for its parliament to act as a norm entrepreneur in terms of a
North African brand of democracy palatable to regional actors across the Arab
world (Robbins, 2016).
Finally, Tunisia operates in forums that are not geared towards democrat-
isation. Apart from the forums mentioned in terms of intra-regional assemblies
like PAM and the PA-UfM (which have their own limitations as discussed previ-
ously), Pan-Arab parliamentary bodies place little emphasis on democracy pro-
motion, as with the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union (AIPU). Founded in 1974,
AIPU is an Arab parliamentary organisation composed of parliamentary groups
representing Arab Parliaments with the aim of strengthening joint Arab action
though its shifting base is reflective of the political instability in the region, having
moved from Damascus to Cairo with plans to relocate to Baghdad. While having
a broad mandate, reference is made to enhance democratic concepts and values
in Arab countries though the majority of its members are non-democratic
regimes and its annual conferences are periodically preoccupied by calls to censor
Israel. Therefore, while boding well for a more ethno-centric form of democracy
promotion, the Tunisian Parliament’s potential to act in a social constructivist
manner as a norm entrepreneur for democracy promotion in the region is lim-
ited, both in terms of its role within Tunisia as a norm entrepreneur as well as an
export model for other Arab states, whether on a bilateral basis or as a member of
the regional IPIs within which it operates.
7. Conclusion
This article discusses the role of international parliamentary institutions in the
democratisation process which began with such optimism after the Arab Spring.
As indicated, only Tunisia can be considered to have transitioned to a functioning
democracy and this reflects the fact that while outside actors may wish to influ-
ence outcomes, the transitioning society and state must have ownership of a pro-
cess for it to be successful. For complex actors like the EU, their ability to
influence normative change outside the EU is compromised by the fact that their
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actions may lack legitimacy and they are not consistent in pushing for normative
change. They also lack the will to coerce change through reward or punishment
while the targets in the receiving states may not have the connections within their
societies to ensure that change is deep. Parliamentary bodies are even more com-
promised in the democratisation process because they often lack any coercive
tools and are dealing with actors, national parliaments, which may have limited
legitimacy back home. Therefore, the IPIs can be considered as highly limited
actors in the area of democracy promotion and that the growth in democratic
Arab parliaments does not indicate greater scope for optimism because these na-
tional parliaments often suffer from a legitimacy gap within their own countries
which means that they are less likely to be able to lead by example.
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